SwissSign Time-Stamping Policy

Document Type: Time-stamping Policy
OID: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.3.5
Author: Mike Doujak, Cornelia Enke
Classification: C1 (public)
Applicability: Global
Owner: CEO
Issue Date: September 04th, 2017
Version: 1.3.1
Storage: SwissSign Document Repository
Distribution: SwissSign AG
Status: Released

This document is subject to the SwissSign audit as an accredited certification authority and may not be altered, invalidated or amended by any side agreements.
## Approval and versions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.01.2006</td>
<td>1.0.0</td>
<td>Initial draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.01.2006</td>
<td>1.0.1</td>
<td>Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.01.2006</td>
<td>1.0.2</td>
<td>Release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.03.2006</td>
<td>1.0.3</td>
<td>Feedback of KPMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.05.2006 – 25.09.2006</td>
<td>1.0.4 – 1.0.10</td>
<td>Review, Final Review, Feedback of KPMG, Added Cert Profile Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>09.05.2007</td>
<td>1.0.11</td>
<td>Review, Minor Changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.04.2008</td>
<td>1.1.1</td>
<td>New layout, Review, Minor Changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.04.2008</td>
<td>1.1.1</td>
<td>Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.09.2010</td>
<td>1.1.2</td>
<td>Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>03.11.2010</td>
<td>1.1.3</td>
<td>Review for G3 CA. New definition of TSU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.11.2015</td>
<td>1.1.4</td>
<td>Md5 and RipeMD160 inoperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.11.216</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Remove SHA1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.01.2017</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Chapter 3 - Update VZertES, TAV and ETSI Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.03.2018</td>
<td>1.3.1</td>
<td>Only new Logo/Look and Feel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Approved by</td>
<td>Approved by</td>
<td>Version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.01.2006</td>
<td>Michael Doujak</td>
<td>Melanie Raemy</td>
<td>1.0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.05.2006</td>
<td>Michael Doujak</td>
<td>Melanie Raemy</td>
<td>1.0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.09.2006</td>
<td>Michael Doujak</td>
<td>Melanie Raemy</td>
<td>1.0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.05.2007</td>
<td>Melanie Raemy</td>
<td>Björn Kanebog</td>
<td>1.0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.04.2008</td>
<td>Adrian Humbel</td>
<td>Björn Kanebog</td>
<td>1.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.01.2011</td>
<td>Adrian Humbel</td>
<td>Michael Doujak</td>
<td>1.1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.11.2015</td>
<td>Reinhard Dietrich</td>
<td>Urs Fischer</td>
<td>1.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.11.2016</td>
<td>Reinhard Dietrich</td>
<td>Urs Fischer</td>
<td>1.1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.06.2018</td>
<td>Reinhard Dietrich</td>
<td>Markus Naef</td>
<td>1.3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SwissSign authorised signatory

**Reinhard Dietrich (CISO)**  
SwissSign AG

**Markus Naef (CEO)**  
SwissSign AG

### Digital signature

- Reinhard Dietrich (CISO)
  - SwissSign AG
  - Signature: Reinhard Dietrich

- Markus Naef (CEO)
  - SwissSign AG
  - Signature: Markus Naef
  - Location: Glattpark, 15. Juni 2018
Table of contents

1. Introduction........................................................................................................................................6
2. Scope..................................................................................................................................................6
3. References.........................................................................................................................................6
4. Definitions and Abbreviations...........................................................................................................7
  4.1 Definitions......................................................................................................................................7
  4.2 Abbreviations.................................................................................................................................8
5. General Concepts .............................................................................................................................8
  5.1 Time-Stamping Services ................................................................................................................8
  5.2 Time-Stamping Authority ............................................................................................................8
  5.3 Subscriber.......................................................................................................................................9
  5.4 Time-Stamp Policy and TSA Practice Statement ........................................................................9
    5.4.1. Purpose....................................................................................................................................9
    5.4.2. Level of Specificity ................................................................................................................9
    5.4.3. Approach ..............................................................................................................................9
6. Time-Stamp Policies ........................................................................................................................9
  6.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................................9
  6.2 Identification ...............................................................................................................................9
  6.3 User Community and Applicability ............................................................................................10
  6.4 Conformance ................................................................................................................................10
7. Obligations and Liability ................................................................................................................11
  7.1 TSA Obligations ........................................................................................................................11
    7.1.1. General ..................................................................................................................................11
    7.1.2. TSA Obligations towards Subscribers ...............................................................................11
  7.2 Subscriber Obligations ..............................................................................................................11
  7.3 Relying Party Obligations ..........................................................................................................11
  7.4 Liability .......................................................................................................................................12
8. Requirements on TSA Practices ....................................................................................................12
  8.1 Practice and Disclosure Statement ...........................................................................................12
    8.1.1. TSA Practice Statement .....................................................................................................12
    8.1.2. TSA Disclosure Statement ...............................................................................................13
  8.2 Key Management Life Cycle ......................................................................................................14
    8.2.1. TSA Key Generation ..........................................................................................................14
    8.2.2. TSU Private Key Protection ..................................................................................................14
    8.2.3. TSU Public Key Distribution ...............................................................................................14
    8.2.4. Rekeying TSU's Key ............................................................................................................14
    8.2.5. End of TSU Key Life Cycle ................................................................................................14
    8.2.6. Life Cycle Management of the Cryptographic Module Used to Sign Time-Stamps ........14
  8.3 Time-Stamping............................................................................................................................15
8.3.1. Time-Stamp Token

8.3.2. Clock Synchronization with UTC

8.4 TSA Management and Operation

8.4.1. Security Management

8.4.2. Asset Classification and Management

8.4.3. Personnel Security

8.4.4. Physical and Environmental Security

8.4.5. Operations Management

8.4.6. System Access Management

8.4.7. Trustworthy Systems Deployment and Maintenance

8.4.8. Compromise of TSA Service

8.4.9. TSA Termination

8.4.10. Compliance with Legal Requirements

8.4.11. Recording of Information Concerning Operation of Time-Stamping Services

8.5 Organizational
1. Introduction

SwissSign AG offers a time-stamping service as part of its certification services in accordance with Swiss Digital Signature Law (ZertES). This service creates and records reliable and trustworthy digital evidence of data at a certain point in time, significantly enhancing the trustworthiness of the electronic data.

SwissSign AG has created a time-stamping authority (SwissSign TSA) to provide the time-stamping service.

This document describes the policy of the Time-stamping Authority (TSA). This TSA policy specifies the general processes and policies of the time-stamping authority for the generation of a time-stamp and its services. Additional processes and technical details are specified in more detail in the SwissSign Platinum Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) [1].

2. Scope

The present document defines operational and managerial practices of the SwissSign Time-Stamping Authority (TSA) so that subscribers and relying parties may assess the trustworthiness of the time-stamping services. The TSA policy requirements are compliant with the stipulations of Swiss Digital Signature Law and support qualified electronic signatures as defined by Swiss Digital Signature Law (ZertES [2]). The SwissSign time-stamping services may be applied to a SwissSign digital signature or to any application requiring positive proof of the existence of digital data at a particular point in time.

These policy requirements are based on public-key cryptography, public-key certificates (X.509), and reliable time sources.

The present document, in conjunction with the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1], may be used by independent bodies to assess the trustworthiness of this TSA and its time-stamping services.

3. References

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Document Title</th>
<th>Document Title Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS</td>
<td>CP/CPS; OID 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2]</td>
<td>Bundesgesetz über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur</td>
<td>ZertES; SR 943.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[6]</td>
<td>Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements</td>
<td>ETSI EN 319 411-1 V1.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[7]</td>
<td>Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU qualified certificates</td>
<td>ETSI EN 319 411-2 V2.1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The applicable CP/CPS may be obtained in their most up-to-date form at: https://repository.swisssign.com.

4. Definitions and Abbreviations

4.1 Definitions

Additional definitions are provided in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relying Party</td>
<td>A Party relying on a time-stamp provided by the SwissSign TSA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subscriber</td>
<td>Individuals using the time-stamp services provided by a TSA and agreeing explicitly to its terms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-stamp policy</td>
<td>Rules applied by the TSA, when generating a time-stamp token.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-stamp token</td>
<td>Data object that binds the existence of digital data to a particular time. This serves as positive proof that certain data existed at this particular time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-stamping Authority</td>
<td>Authority which issues time-stamp tokens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TSA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSA Disclosure Statement</td>
<td>Policies and practices of a TSA that require particular emphasis or disclosure to subscribers and relying parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSA Practice Statement</td>
<td>Statement of the practices that a TSA employs in issuing time-stamp tokens.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Term | Description
--- | ---
TSA system | IT Infrastructure to support the provision of time-stamping services
Time-stamping unit | Hardware and software components which are managed as a unit to provide time-stamp tokens from a single time source. Components may be cloned or implemented redundantly for high availability reasons.
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) | Mean solar time at the prime meridian (0°). The time scale is based on the second, as defined in ETSI EN 319 421 [10] and in ITU-R Recommendation TF.460-5.
UTC(k) | Time scale realized by a laboratory “k” in close agreement with UTC, with the goal to reach ±100 ns.

4.2 Abbreviations

Abbreviation | Description
--- | ---
BIPM | International Bureau of Weights and Measures (Bureau international des poids et mesures)
GMT | Greenwich Mean Time
IERS | International Earth Rotation Service
TAI | International Atomic Time (Temps atomique international)
TSA | Time-Stamping Authority
TST | Time-Stamp Token
TSU | Time-Stamping Unit
UTC | Coordinated Universal Time

5. General Concepts

5.1 Time-Stamping Services

The time-stamping services includes two components:

- Time-stamping provision: The technical component generating time-stamp tokens.
- Time-stamping management: The service component that monitors and controls the operation of the time-stamping services. The time-stamping management guarantees that the clock used in time-stamping is correctly synchronized with UTC.

5.2 Time-Stamping Authority

The SwissSign TSA issues secure time-stamp tokens (TST) for users of the time-stamping services (i.e. Subscribers as well as Relying Parties).

The SwissSign TSA assumes the overall responsibility for the provision of the time-stamping services identified in chapter 5.1. The SwissSign TSA may operate several identifiable time-stamping units (TSU’s) and each TSU must have a different key (see chapter 8.3.1).

Within a TSU it is permissible to clone key material and to use redundant components to meet high availability requirements.

The SwissSign TSA is identified in the digital certificate used for the time-stamping services.

The Certificate Profile and Extensions are shown in the Chapter 7.1 of the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1].
5.3 Subscriber

The subscriber may be an organization or a single individual end-user.

If the subscriber is an organization, the obligations that apply to that organization also apply to its associated end-users. In any case, the organization will be held responsible if the obligations are not correctly fulfilled by the end-users; therefore, such an organization must suitably inform its end-users.

If the subscriber is an individual end-user, the end-user will be held directly responsible for the fulfillment of the obligations.

5.4 Time-Stamp Policy and TSA Practice Statement

5.4.1. Purpose

The time-stamp policy and time-stamp practice statement are defined as follows:

- TSA Policy states the issues that “must be adhered to”. Included are the rules and processes applied by the TSA when generating a time-stamp token.
- TSA Practice Statement is a declaration of “how the time-stamping service is implemented to meet the policy requirements”.
- Complementary to the processes described in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1], this TSA policy describes time-stamping specific processes and policies.

5.4.2. Level of Specificity

The TSA policy specifies the processes used to provide time-stamping services, adequately extending the processes which are described in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1].

5.4.3. Approach

The TSA Policy will focus on general processes. Technical details, such as organizational structure, operating procedures, and communication infrastructure are specified in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1] or additional internal documents. Internal documents are not publicly available.

6. Time-Stamp Policies

6.1 Overview

This TSA policy comprises a set of rules and processes to be used for issuing trustworthy time-stamp tokens in accordance with Swiss Digital Signature Law (ZertES) [2] and, in particular, the rules of ETSI EN 319 421 [10].

6.2 Identification

This document is named “SwissSign Time-Stamping Policy” as indicated on the cover page of this document.

The Object identification number (OID) of this document is:

OID 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.3.6

The OID of SwissSign AG is structured as follows:
Position 1 to 5 shown above have been issued by the Swiss Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM).

Position 6 to 8 of the SwissSign OID number represent the document and 9 represents the document version.

This OID is referenced in every time-stamp issued by this TSA.

### 6.3 User Community and Applicability

The SwissSign AG time-stamping services meet the requirements of time-stamping qualified signatures in accordance with Swiss Digital Signature Law (ZertES) [2].

Users of this time-stamping service are only Subscribers and Relying Parties of a SwissSign digital certificate. No other restrictions are imposed. The SwissSign time-stamps may be applied to any applications requiring positive proof that certain data existed before a particular point in time.

### 6.4 Conformance

SwissSign AG includes a policy identifier (OID) (see chapter 6.2) in all time-stamp tokens issued by this TSA.

The conformance to this time-stamp policy is subject to periodic independent internal and external assessments.

SwissSign AG meets the obligations defined in chapter 7.1 and ensures the implementation of appropriate controls as specified in chapter 8.
7. Obligations and Liability

7.1 TSA Obligations

7.1.1. General

The SwissSign TSA ensures conformance with the requirements prescribed in this TSA policy and provides all time-stamping services in accordance with:

- the rules set forth in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1]
- the stipulations of ZertES[2]
- the regulations of TAV[4]

This TSA Policy and the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1] are an integral part of the agreements between SwissSign AG, the Subscribers, and the Relying Parties.

7.1.2. TSA Obligations towards Subscribers

The SwissSign TSA guarantees that time-stamp tokens are issued in accordance with the following:

- The TSA operates in accordance with all relevant regulations, especially those stipulated and defined by the Swiss Digital Signature Law.
- The time-stamping unit (TSU) is in accordance with a minimum UTS time accuracy of +/- 1 second.
- SwissSign AG undertakes periodic independent internal and external assessments of its compliance with Swiss Digital Signature Law.
- The SwissSign TSA provides a time-stamping service of high availability backed up by redundant infrastructure. The availability is guaranteed as long as none of the following occur: planned technical interruptions, natural disasters, wars, acts of terrorism, strikes, failures of the Internet or other causes of interruption as stipulated in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] in chapter 9.

7.2 Subscriber Obligations

The subscriber shall accept the “End-User Agreement for SwissSign Platinum TSA”, before using the Time-Stamp Service of SwissSign AG.

The subscriber shall use the Time-stamping service only in compliance with chapter 4 of ETSI 319 422 [11] “Requirements for a TSP client”.

The subscriber shall verify that the time-stamp token has been correctly signed by the time-stamp authority and that the private key used to sign the time-stamp token has not been revoked.

7.3 Relying Party Obligations

When relying on a time-stamp token, the Relying Party shall verify that the time-stamp token was correctly signed and that the private key used to sign the time-stamp token has not been revoked.

During the validity period of the TSU's certificate, the validity of the signing key can be verified on the SwissSign CRL.
If the verification takes place after expiry of the certificate’s validity period, the relying party shall check whether the employed hash function, algorithms, and cryptographic key lengths can still be deemed secure.

For further terms and conditions applicable to Relying Parties, refer to the TSA Disclosure Statement in chapter 8.1.2 and to other agreements between the parties.

7.4 Liability
SwissSign AG operates its TSA in accordance with this TSP, SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1], and the terms of other binding agreements between SwissSign AG and the TSA service users. SwissSign AG endeavors to provide high availability of its services, but makes no express or implied representations or warranties to uninterrupted services or accuracy of the time-stamp services.

SwissSign AG is only liable for damages to Subscribers or Relying Parties that result from SwissSign’s failure to comply with Swiss Digital Signature Law (Article 17 ZertES). SwissSign AG must supply evidence that they have adhered to applicable laws, rules, and regulations.

SwissSign AG shall in no event be liable, for any loss of profits, indirect and consequential damages, or loss of data, to the extent permitted by applicable law. SwissSign AG shall not be liable for any damages resulting from infringements by the Subscriber or the Relying Party on the applicable terms and conditions, including the exceeding of the transaction limit.

SwissSign AG shall under no circumstances be liable for damages that result from force majeur events as detailed in chapter 7.1.2. of this TSA Policy and in chapter 9.16.5 in SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1]. SwissSign AG shall take commercially reasonable measures to mitigate the effects of force majeur in due time. Any damages resulting from any delay caused by force majeur will not be covered by SwissSign AG.

The detailed liability limitations applicable to the parties are specified in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS chapter 9 [1].

8. Requirements on TSA Practices
The TSA operates its services in accordance with the rules established in this TSP, the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1], and additional internal documents defining technical, operational and procedural requirements.

It is in the sole discretion of SwissSign AG to provide the TSA services to a Requester.

8.1 Practice and Disclosure Statement

8.1.1. TSA Practice Statement
The TSA practice statement defines how SwissSign AG is to adhere to the relevant requirements, identified in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1] and other internal documents.

The defined procedures and their correct implementation by SwissSign AG are audited by KPMG AG in their role as the official certification body for Swiss Digital Signature Services in accordance with the Swiss Digital Signature Law (ZertES)[2].

This TSA Practice Statement and other relevant documentation will be published on: http://repository.swisssign.com.
The TSA Disclosure Statement is included in chapter 8.1.2 of this TSA policy document. Internal documents are not to be published.

Amendments to this TSA Practice or other published documents are implemented according to the provisions set forth in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1] chapter 9.12.

8.1.2. TSA Disclosure Statement

The terms and conditions, set forth herein, are binding to all Subscribers and Relying Parties using SwissSign time-stamping services. Other documents, which form integral part of this TSP, such as the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1] can be found on the SwissSign website http://repository.swisssign.com/.

- The SwissSign TSA is a service of SwissSign AG, certified under Swiss Digital Signature Law as a qualified certification service provider.
- For contact information, refer to SwissSign platinum CP/CPS [1] chapter 1.5.2 (Contact persons).
- Each time-stamping token issued by SwissSign Time-stamping service includes the policy object-identifier defined in chapter 6.2 (Identification).
- The algorithms employed and the length of cryptographic keys are as follows:
  - Hash-algorithms: SHA-2 (OID: 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1))
  - signing algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption, 2048 key length (OID: 1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)

These algorithms are supported in accordance with TAV [4] and ETSI TS 119 312 [12]. However SwissSign AG recommends to use SHA-2 as hash algorithm.
- According to and ETSI EN 319 321 [10] and and ETSI TS 119 312 [12] only sha256WithRSAEncryption may have an expected usability period beyond 2017.
- The TSA ensures time accuracy compliant with the minimum UTC time accuracy standards of +/- 1 second. The SwissSign TSA will not issue time-stamp tokens, if the time accuracy is no longer secured.
- The SwissSign time-stamping service may be limited to Subscribers of a valid SwissSign AG qualified digital certificate.
- Subscriber obligations are described in chapter 7.2 (Subscriber Obligations) of this document.
- The use of the following fields in the time-stamping request is supported:
  - the reqPolicy;
  - the nonce; and
  - the certReq
- The following fields are present in the time-stamping answer:
  - the reqPolicy;
  - the nonce; and
  - the certReq
- A Relying Party's obligations and information on how Relying Party can verify the trustworthiness of the TST are described in chapter 7.3 (Relying Party Obligations) of this document.
- SwissSign AG may oblige Subscribers and Relying Parties to comply with additional End-User Agreements that are compliant with Swiss Digital Signature Law and the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1] to the extent permitted by Swiss law.
- SwissSign AG may charge fees for the services offered by SwissSign TSA.
- SwissSign AG maintains records on the operations of the SwissSign TSA, in accordance with chapter 5.4 (Audit logging procedures) of the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1].
SwissSign AG is only liable for damages to Subscribers and Relying Parties in connection with valid SwissSign qualified certificates relied upon in accordance with Swiss Digital Signature Law. The limitations of liability are defined in chapter 7.4 of this document, in chapter 9 of the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] and other service agreements with users.

The laws of Switzerland shall govern this time-stamping service. The details on applicable law and dispute resolution procedures related to the SwissSign TSA are defined in chapter 9 of the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] and in other applicable agreements.

The SwissSign AG TSA conformity with applicable laws and regulations is assessed by KPMG AG the official certification body according to Swiss Digital Signatures Law (ZertES) [2].

8.2 Key Management Life Cycle

8.2.1. TSA Key Generation

SwissSign AG generates the cryptographic keys in a physically secured environment by personnel in trusted roles. Algorithms, the resulting key length and signature algorithms are described in chapter 8.1.2. of this TSP.

The SwissSign TSA keys are generated obeying the same procedures and at the same time as are the keys for SwissSign Platinum-issuing CAs.

The key management life cycle of the TSA keys is identical to that of the subsidiary CA's of SwissSign AG. Specific documentation can be found in chapter 6 in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1].

8.2.2. TSU Private Key Protection

The SwissSign TSA ensures that the confidentiality and integrity of their keys is maintained. In particular the HSM module meets the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 3.

8.2.3. TSU Public Key Distribution

The SwissSign TSA certificate are issued with a level of security that is equivalent to the ones described for the SwissSign CA, more details are defined in SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1]. Relevant information can be found on the SwissSign ldap directory and the SwissSign web sites, see also chapter 6 of the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS [1].

8.2.4. Rekeying TSU's Key

The SwissSign TSA keys shall be replaced before the expiration of their validity period, if the chosen algorithm, key length or other relevant security measures are no longer state-of-the-art.

8.2.5. End of TSU Key Life Cycle

The SwissSign TSA ensures that the private keys are not used beyond their expiration date. Time-stamps cannot be issued with expired private keys. Expired keys are destroyed as described in SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] chapter 6.

8.2.6. Life Cycle Management of the Cryptographic Module Used to Sign Time-Stamps

SwissSign AG has established procedures to ensure that hardware security modules for non-repudiation services are not tampered with during shipment and storage. Installation and activation of signing keys in cryptographic hardware is performed only by personnel in trusted roles. Additional internal documentation describes the handling and procedures of HSM. The SSCD life cycle management is described in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS chapter 6 [1].
8.3 Time-Stamping

8.3.1 Time-Stamp Token
SwissSign TSA issues time-stamp tokens in accordance with RFC 3161[14].

In particular the TST practices follows the principles below:

- The TST includes an identifier for the Time-stamping Policy.
- The TST includes an identifier for the TSA and TSU.
- The date and time can be traced to UTC-defined reliable time source.
- The time included in the TST shall be synchronized with the UTC within the accuracy of +/- 1 second.
- If the SwissSign time-stamp clock is not within the stated accuracy no TST shall be issued.
- The TST shall include a representation (i.e. hash value) of the digital data being time-stamped.
- The TST is signed using a key exclusively for the purposes of time-stamping.
- The TST shall include the digital signature of the SwissSign TSA.

8.3.2 Clock Synchronization with UTC
The SwissSign TSA uses its own network time server, which is synchronized with three independent time sources to achieve synchronization with UTC within the declared accuracy of +/- 1 second.

Controls are in place to detect changes in clock calibration and/or synchronization problems that threaten to compromise the declared accuracy.

The TSA ensures correct handling of leap seconds during the last minute of the day when the leap second is scheduled to occur.

8.4 TSA Management and Operation

8.4.1 Security Management
The SwissSign TSA security management is described in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] chapter 5 and 6.

8.4.2 Asset Classification and Management
The SwissSign TSA ensures that information and other assets receive appropriate security treatment as defined in SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] chapter 5 and 6.

8.4.3 Personnel Security
The personnel security controls of the SwissSign TSA are defined in SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] chapter 5.3.

8.4.4 Physical and Environmental Security
SwissSign AG ensures the physical and environmental security of its TSA as defined in SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] chapter 5.1.
8.4.5. Operations Management

The SwissSign TSA maintains adequate operational controls in compliance with ETSI EN 319 421 [10]. These documents and policies are internal and not publicly available and are periodically assessed by internal and external reviews to ensure compliance and effectiveness of these controls.

8.4.6. System Access Management

SwissSign TSA has adequate access controls in place as defined in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] chapter 5.

8.4.7. Trustworthy Systems Deployment and Maintenance

The TSA keys and its services are produced in a trustworthy environment. The systems and products used by SwissSign AG to provide adequate services are in accordance with the required levels of assurance. SwissSign AG ensures to undertake adequate analysis of security requirements and has respective change-control procedures in place.

8.4.8. Compromise of TSA Service

In the case of a compromise of a private key of the TSA service of SwissSign AG the procedures defined in SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] chapter 5.7 will be executed. No time-stamp tokens will be issued if the TSA private key is compromised. If the required accuracy of the minimum UTC time accuracy of +/- 1 second is compromised, no time-stamp tokens will be issued until the calibration is restored.

Relevant information is made available to Subscriber and Relying Parties on the SwissSign web page. Additionally, the subscribers will be informed by e-mail as soon as possible.

8.4.9. TSA Termination

The termination of the SwissSign TSA is handled according to the procedures defined for SwissSign CA termination in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS chapter 5.8 [1].

8.4.10. Compliance with Legal Requirements

The SwissSign TSA services complies with the requirements of the Swiss Digital Signature Law and other relevant rules and regulations. SwissSign AG ensures that adequate measures are taken against unauthorized or unlawful processing of personal data. SwissSign AG also ensures complete confidentiality of personal data and other information contributed by users to the TSA unless permitted by written agreement, by law, or by court order in accordance with applicable Data Protection Law.

8.4.11. Recording of Information Concerning Operation of Time-Stamping Services

Records concerning the operation of the time-stamping service are written and safeguarded in the same manner as records concerning the SwissSign AG Certificate Authority operation. The respective controls ensure integrity, confidentiality and the required archiving of all records as stipulated in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1].

SwissSign AG ensures that adequate measures are taken against unauthorized or unlawful processing of its records unless permitted by written agreement, by law or by court order in accordance with applicable Data Protection Law.
Record logging of life cycle management events of the SwissSign TSA keys is performed in the same manner as it is with the keys of the SwissSign Platinum issuing CAs. The CA life cycle management is described in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] in chapter 4.

The TSA also logs relevant events related to clock synchronization in its TSU.

### 8.5 Organizational

The organization that maintains the SwissSign TSA is the same one that maintains the subsidiary CAs of the SwissSign Platinum CA. The organizational, technical, and personal security measures are defined in the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS[1] and in accordance with relevant other laws and regulations as defined in this TSP.